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MORAL ISSUES IN THE LAW
CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG*

F

persist prominently in the approach of the positive
law to the control of crime and delinquency among young persons.
They present the gravest moral and legal challenge of the mid-twentieth
century. One is the question of responsibility of the young offender.
Assuming that immature persons are to be held accountable for their
voluntary behavior (some argue that they should not be held responsible
at all), at what age, for what acts, and with what treatment consequences
should responsibility be fixed? Closely related is the issue of parental
responsibility. Should parents be subject to the sanction of law for any
or all criminal behavior of their children? Third is the issue of control of
a condition widely believed to be conducive to crime and delinquency
among minors; viz., dissemination of horror and obscene literature and
films. What is a just and proper balance between liberty of opinion, on
one hand, and the circulation of such pernicious materials, on the other?
Finally, there is the crucial matter of moral and religious education in
government sponsored schools. Does some "wall" of separation of church
and state demand that one generation after another of young Americans
be deprived of moral and religious training in public schools and colleges?
The first issue, that of the limits of responsibility of young persons, is
the current subject of consideration for model state legislation by the
American Law Institute and more particularly of debate in the legislative
halls of New York on the new Youth Court Act. Parental responsibility
is a recent recurrent subject of various legislative experiments. The issues
of control of pernicious literature and religion in the public schools are
subjects of frequent state legislation and sharply divided judicial opinion
in the Supreme Court of the United States. All four issues relate to the
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control of crime and delinquency among
minors. All of these present problems of
law for legislatures and courts. All involve
moral considerations of the first magnitude
for their resolution.
Responsibility of Young Offenders
A 14-year-old high school freshman fires
round after round of .22 calibre bullets into
his mother and sister, and witnesses
the collapse of his
surviving father.'
There is mild surprise when the
prosecutor proclaims that what
some supposed to
be multiple murder
does not amount
even to the merest
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG
misdemeanor in
the rankings and gradations of our current
criminal code. The author of this tragedy
cannot be subjected to preliminary examination before a magistrate, indictment by a
grand jury, arraignment and trial in a criminal court, conviction and sentence by a
judge, or punishment even in the form of
confinement in a state prison. Because of
his immaturity, the boy involved must be
regarded as a ward of the state, not a criminal defendant. An informal proceeding,
without prosecution, jury, or rigid rules
of evidence, can result only in adjudication
of status as a delinquent and not in stigma
of guilt. The treatment consequences of
such proceeding may not be punitive, although compulsory institutionalization for
the sake of education and rehabilitation
may be prescribed.
Special lenient treatment in the case of
SN.Y.Times, May 23, 1957,p. 1; May 24, 1957, p. 1.

young offenders is by no means historic.
The entire notion of juvenile delinquency is
a relatively recent contrivance. From the
time of the Romans through the Canon Law
and then into the English Common Law the
rules of responsibility for young offenders
remained unchanged. There was absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution for
children under seven. Those seven and over
who committed crimes were as fully liable
as adults, except that under 14 (in some
places 12) such children were presumed
incapable of committing crimes. This presumption was rebuttable by proof of malice
which somehow was supposed to make up
for the deficiency in age. Convictions of
children in this country for arson, assault,
manslaughter and murder - with an occasional execution - prbvided the humanitarian impulse for reform fifty years ago
leading to enactment of juvenile court acts
in all but two states, and in most of the
2
nations of the world.
What constitutes "delinquency" under
this half-century old juvenile court arrangement depends upon chronological age, sex
and certain proscribed behavior, which vary
with jurisdiction. In New York, the maximum age is sixteen, but eighteen or higher
is the upper age limit in most states. In all
states with such statutes, behavior which
would be criminal if engaged in by an adult,
constitutes delinquency - with varying exceptions for serious crimes. In New York,
since 1949, these exceptions constitute
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, if committed by children between
fifteen and sixteen. In such cases, whether
the offender is to be treated as a criminal or
juvenile delinquent depends upon the dis3
cretion of the criminal court.
2 LUDWIG, YOUTH AND THE LAW 134-35 (1955).

3 Id. at 5.

3

There is no insistent demand for fundamental revision of such juvenile court jurisdiction and procedure. The wisdom of judicial leniency for the immature can be justified by numerous practical considerations.
To attempt to inflict mandatory penalties
upon young offenders in the same way as
upon adults would nullify the possibility of
any treatment at all. The sharp contrast between the severity of the penalty and the
age of the offender makes the ordinary jury
reluctant to return a verdict of guilt. Certainly, compulsory institutionalization, even
for a half dozen years, is a safer course for
social protection than the alternative of acquittal with no treatment at all.
I Apart from the probability of such nullification, considerations of humanity suggest the wisdom of subjecting children who
commit crimes to treatment for sake of their
rehabilitation and not to punishment in order to deter them. Childhood and adolescence are periods of formative flexibility.
The character of any person, child, adolescent or adult, is the sum total of his potentialities for good and evil. In the case of the
young offender, it may well be that he has
prematurely realized all of his potentialities
for evil and has yet to develop the counteracting ones for good. If so, a program of
treatment that provides maximum opportunity for fruition of undeveloped potentialities for good is likely in the long run to
prevent recurrence of delinquent behavior.
At the same time a program of punitive
treatment might suppress and inhibit not
only the evil but also the good potentialities
and lead to abortive growth of a dangerous
and embittered personality more likely than
ever to commit a crime.
The heart of the problem of responsibility
currently centers on the upward extension
of socialized treatment to offenders in the
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young adult period of life. In most states,
juvenile court jurisdiction goes no further
than age 18, with some states as low as 16,
and only a few as high as 21.1 Since 1940,
two separate proposals for older adolescent
offenders have been made with extremely
limited adoption among the states. Drastic
revision of both is under current consideration. These will be discussed in some detail.
A. The New York Youth Court Act.
Prior to 1943, New York remained one of
a minority of five states that limited the
upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction to a
level as low as 16. Indeed, at that time,
crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment were excluded from such jurisdiction.
In 1943, the Youthful Offender Act, applicable to offenders 16 through 18 at the
time of commission of the crime, was
adopted. With two exceptions a youth between those ages arrested for a crime might
be investigated at the instance of the district
attorney, the grand jury, or trial court judge,
to determine whether he should stand trial
as an adult or be accorded special noncriminal status and treatment as a "Youthful Offender." The exceptions were for
charges of crimes punishable by death or
life imprisonment, and for youths with prior
felony convictions. If found eligible, the indictment or information on the original
criminal charge was sealed, and the charge
of "Youthful Offender" substituted. Upon
plea of guilty, or upon being found guilty
after a non-jury trial, the defendant was adjudged a youthful offender and thus avoided
the stigma of a criminal record. As such, he
might be committed for an indefinite term
up to three years, or receive a suspended
sentence involving a three to five-year period of probation. Commitment might be to
4 Id. at

69-74.
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a public or private reformative institution,
but not to a prison. 5
In 1956, the Youth Court Act was
adopted providing several modifications of
youthful offender proceedings. A single
Youth Court presided over by a county
court judge is established for each county.
In addition, the socialized procedure and
treatment of the Youthful Offender Act is
extended along several lines: (1) offenders
19 and 20, as well as wayward minors and
adolescent drug users, are included; (2) offenders 16 and 17 taken into custody and
charged with such crimes are relieved of the
stigma of arrest if they are accorded youthful offender treatment; (3) indictment by
grand jury for felonies in such cases is no
longer necessary unless the offender wishes
to have his case presented to that body; and
(4) the present maximum indefinite term of
three years for institutional treatment is extended to five. 6
The effective date of this measure, scheduled for February 1, 1957, was postponed
fourteen months by subsequent statute,
principally to enable counties to set up necessary machinery to implement its administration.7 But assuming arguendo that
young adult offenders who commit serious
crimes are more suitable subjects for rehabilitation than older ones, the New
York system, considered as a program of
socialized treatment, has substantial shortcomings sufficient to make unlikely its
widespread adoption in other states:
(a) Consent of an offender, legislatively
declared to be immature, is prerequisite to
5 See Ludwig, Considerations Basic to Reform of
Juvenile Oflender Laws, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.

226 n. 1 (1955).
6 Ibid.
7 Laws of N.Y. 1957, c. 3.

setting in motion the machinery for his
rehabilitation.
(b) Procedural safeguards for the protection of the accused in criminal proceedings may be by-passed. Indictment by grand
jury, for example, is some assurance that a
serious crime has in fact been committed.
Heretofore, a defendant's willingness to
plead guilty has been of no avail unless he
pleads to a valid accusation of crime. The
screening of a serious charge by a grand
jury is a circumstantial guarantee designed
for the protection of the accused.
(c) Absence of such indictment making
a specific charge, the recording of competent proof substantiating it, a verdict by a
jury on a specific issue of fact, and judgment
entered on that verdict by a judge, leave no
precise picture of the criminal conduct for
which an alleged offender may be restrained for as many as five years. In estimating the potential for reformation of any
youth, it is important to know whether his
behavior was serious or trivial.
(d) One judge may deny the benefits of
youthful offender treatment to virtually all
youths charged with crimes like robbery or
rape; another may invariably grant such
treatment to qualified youths in such cases.
There is no appellate review of the exercise
of such discretion. Identical offenses involving materially similar offenders are not assured equal treatment under the Act, except
in the limited situation of offenses of the
grade of misdemeanor or less committed by
youths under eighteen.
(e) The stigma of criminal conviction is
withheld for criminal conduct in the case
of all youthful offenders without regard to
whether or not they are subsequently convicted of serious crimes. One of the principal purposes of the act is to prevent
youths, capable of rehabilitation, from be-

3
coming avowed enemies of society by branding them criminals forever on the basis of
a single offense. It is not the aim of the Act,
however, to enable multiple felony offenders
to subtract their first major felony in any
compilation of their criminal record.
Numerous advances, with value peculiar
to New York, are offered by the Youth
Court Act: probation facilities for young
adults who commit misdemeanors and offenses are equated to the superior ones formerly available only for felony offenders;
provisions are made for teachers and scholarships in probation work; new institutional
facilities of the "minimum security" type
are set up, such as reforestation camps and
hostels or foster homes.
B. American Law Institute
Model Statutes.

The Model Youth Correction Authority Act, adopted by the American Law
Institute in 1940, offers an approach to the
reformation of young adult offenders fundamentally different from that of the New
York plan. There is no repudiation of the
criminal nature of the proceedings involving an accused youth, or the consequence of
conviction in which they may culminate.
Accordingly, the elaborate constitutional
and procedural safeguards developed in the
course of centuries for the protection of the
accused in Anglo-American criminal justice, are preserved intact. Courts determine
disputed issues of guilt or innocence in
accordance with rules of evidence and
criminal procedure. After judgment of conviction, the socialized process begins with
the program of rehabilitation of the Youth
Authority to which the offender is committed. In fifteen years since its promulgation, the Model Act has been adopted and
.made applicable to young adult offenders in
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only two states - California and Minnesota,
with a handful of other jurisdictions" making selected sections of the Act applicable
to juvenile offenders.
The basic principle of providing specialized rehabilitative treatment for young
adults after court disposition of their cases
is continued in the most recent modifications of the Act tentatively adopted by the
American Law Institute. 9 Several significant
changes are proposed.
Eligible Age. The New York system applies to offenders who at the time of the
commission of the crime, are between sixteen and twenty-one. The Model Youth
Correction Authority Act provided for an
identical age group, measured however by
the time of apprehension and not that of
commission. The recent tentative modification of this Act suggests ages sixteen to
twenty-two, determined by the time of sentence. These are the limits adopted by Congress in the Federal Youth Correction Act of
1950, applicable to the somewhat inappreciable proportion of young offenders who
come under Federal criminal jurisdiction.
Exclusion of Serious Crimes. Both the
New York statute and the Model Youth
Correction Authority Act exclude youths
who commit crimes punishable by death or
life imprisonment. The tentative modification of the Model Act would not exclude
youths sentenced to life imprisonment.
Stigma of Conviction. No explicit
provision for avoiding the brand of conviction was made in the original Model Act
of the American Law Institute. The New
York Act, by making this the central consideration, denies the criminal nature of
8 Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Texas and
Wisconsin.
9 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE 22-23 (Tent. Draft No.
7, 1957).
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proceedings involving youthful offenders.
The tentative modifications of the American Law Institute provide for an order at
the time of sentence that judgment shall
not constitute a disqualifying conviction so
long as the offender is not. subsequently
convicted of another felony.
Other modifications include duration of
treatment that is fixed with no minimum
and a maximum of four years, regardless
of the degree of the felony, and a discretionary commitment up to ninety days in
advance of sentence to aid the court in
determining whether to impose the traditional penalty or the maximum four year
commitment. The separate Youth Correction Authority is abandoned as the treatment agency in favor of a special division
within the framework of correction departments as they now exist in most states.
Despite insistent demand, during the past
fifteen years, only four jurisdictions have
subscribed to programs of socialized treatment along these lines for offenders above
juvenile court jurisdiction age. This is not
surprising. About two-thirds of the most
serious aggressive felonies are committed
by youths under twenty-one. Drastic revisions of criminal codes affecting upper
adolescent age groups would be tantamount to repeal of present penal provisions in the case of all but a third of the
most serious crimes. The demands for
social protection against dangerous persons
have undoubtedly made many states unwilling to drain their criminal codes of their
deterrent efficacy, especially in the age
group that has produced a disproportionate
number of the most dangerous offenders.
We are urged to substitute rehabilitation
for punishment as the exclusive goal of
treatment among a group of offenders Who
have manifested the maximum likelihood

to repeat their crimes. Yet practically all of
these young adult offenders have come
into conflict with the law at earlier ages.
During their more formative and flexible
years, the mandatory program of juvenile
court rehabilitation has somehow not succeeded in their cases. One may ask why a
similar program undertaken at a later
period of less formative and flexible development has appreciable probability of success. Meanwhile, why stop at age 21 or 22?
"Surely, there must be some violators over
21 years of age who might safely be given
similar treatment so that they, likewise,
would not be branded with the stigma of
a criminal arrest and conviction with the
serious consequences which sometimes
10
follow in later life."
What is urgently needed is some demonstration that lawbreaking youths can be
transformed into law observing ones in a
large scale program under public auspices.
Perhaps it would be wiser to thrust these
young offenders precipitately into our correctional machinery, rather than await
development of workable techniques of
rehabilitation. Necessity is after all the
mother of invention, and to pose the problem of reforming young offenders in its
gross, immediate and physical aspect,
might galvanize government agencies to
come up with its solution. Yet even supposing a solution in the shape of a sound
system of rehabilitation of offenders in
early adulthood, such program could
promise little, if anything, in the way of
halting or reducing the ever increasing
incidence of crime among our young population. It cannot do so, because the program of reform begins to operate only after
the tragic consequences of murder, rape,
10 LUDWIG, YOUTH AND THE LAW vii-viii (1955).

3
and maiming have been suffered by the
community. Relaxing the ground rules for
handling young offenders after the event is
not likely to prevent crime before it occurs.
Controlling Conditions Conducive to
Crime and Delinquenicy
Whether tomorrow's young adult offender is to become a convicted felon
deposited in a state prison, or an adjudicated youthful offender reposing in some
reformative institution, is a question of
moment. But that issue is wide of the mark
of preventing serious crime among young
persons before it occurs. If we are to come.
to grips realistically with the current serious situation, we must face up to the
conditions that give rise to delinquency.
Three of these conditions pose questions of
law with moral implications.
A. Parental Responsibility
It has long been known that the moral
judgments of children are more closely
correlated with those of their parents than
with the judgments of anyone else, including playmates, school teachers, and even
Sunday school teachers." Two groups of
boys between eleven and seventeen - one
group delinquent and the other not - were
matched as to age, intelligence, ethnic
background, and area of residence. The
delinquent group was readily identifiable
on the basis of several deficiencies in
parental supervision and parent-child relations. 12 We are repeatedly reminded of the
broken home as a factor in delinquency.
No doubt such homes account for a disproportionate share of young offenders;
they do not explain all such cases. The
12 GLUECK
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divorce rate in the United States is still
alarmingly high. During the past decade,
however, the precipitate rise in delinquency
was matched by a downward trend in
marriages disrupted by divorce (approximately 610,000, or 4.3 per 1,000 population for 1946, declining 46.5 percent to
about 373,000, or 2.3 per 1,000 in
1956). l3 Clearly, measures must be taken
to strengthen all homes, and not merely
those broken by judicial decree.
Responses to a recent survey of police
chiefs covering more than 56 million
people, including almost 95 percent of the
population living in cities of 100,000 and
more, indicate that an overwhelming
majority (86.1 percent) recommended that
more consistent enforcement of adequate
statutes on parent responsibility would
reduce delinquency. Only a little more than
a third (38.2 percent) found existing
statutes adequate, and indeed only a bare
majority (57.4 percent) were aware of the
existence of legislation in this field. 14 This
was so although all but two states in fact
have statutes making parents criminally
responsible for the delinquent acts of their
offspring.
Existing statutes on parent responsibility
vary in many particulars from state to
state: 1 5 whether the adult responsible must
be a parent or guardian, or may be any
person; whether or not the child must be
adjudicated delinquent before conviction
of its parent is lawful; whether juvenile, or
criminal courts, or both concurrently,
have jurisdiction to try offending parents;
13 1957 World Almanac, pp. 365, 375.
14 THE INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,

11 HARTSHONE & MAY, STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928).
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and the severity or leniency of punishment
upon conviction. All of these statutes make
criminal the intentional contributions to
the delinquency of minors, i.e., by counsel,
command, inducement, or procurement of
a child to commit a crime. No one can
seriously dispute the application of these
statutes to such flagrantly deliberate parental conduct. The statutes, however, have
remained largely a dead letter. The relatively few reported cases in which they
have been invoked have involved negligent
and not intentional behavior. In this area
of careless conduct of parents, the statutes
are uniformly vague in prescribing a
standard of parental conduct, being no
more specific than to make criminal omission "to exercise reasonable diligence in
the control of a child," or "to permit such
child" to engage in various proscribed patterns of behavior. The imposition of
criminal responsibility without fair advance
warning in such instances cannot be justified. It does not mean, however, that parents cannot and should not be made
responsible by positive sanction for obligations imposed by higher law.
In a few states, there have been recent
efforts to establish civil sanctions to encourage parent responsibility. Anti-vandalism acts 6 have imposed civil liability up
to three hundred dollars in damages on
parents for willful misconduct of their
children resulting in injury to another's
property. Such legislation extends the
sharply limited exceptions of vicarious
liability beyond any judicial development
of the law of torts. It applies only to the
single offense of malicious mischief, among
the many and more serious ones committed by juveniles. Finally, the economic
burden of damages falls unequally on poor
16 E.g., California and Michigan.

parents compared with their more financially privileged neighbors.
A somewhat more ingenious use of noncriminal sanction is the recent experiment
in New York 17 making.parents liable in
civil contempt for willful refusal to obey a
written order of the children's court specifying measures to be taken to prevent the
continued delinquency of their children.
The issuance of such an order to a parent
upon the adjudication of delinquency of
its child is discretionary with the judge. In
the first six months since the effective date
of this statute, the children's court in the
City of New York entertained no proceedings against parents under this statute.
Indeed in more than ten thousand new
cases of delinquents before the court during the entire year, only ten adults were
involved in proceedings under any statute.18 Obviously, success depends on a
less lethargic and more sympathetic approach to the administration of such a
statute. Lacking this, a mandatory measure
by the legislature would be indicated.
It is argued that better men cannot be
made by acts of parliaments. We ask,
where else can such a program under public auspices begin? It is urged that even
mild compulsion will hamper the socialized
approach and cloud the permissive atmosphere of our children's courts. But if sanction and authority have no role in the resolution of such social problems, then it is
time for the police and courts to abandon
the field entirely in favor of some nonenforcement, non-judicial and, perhaps,
Laws of N.Y. 1956, c. 949, amending, N.Y.
§22, and N.Y.C. DOM. REL.
CT. ACT §83.

17

CHILDREN'S CT. ACT

18 REPORT

OF THE DOMESTIC

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

(1957).

RELATIONS COURT

pt. 2, table 2, p. 2
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non-governmental agency. This, in our
view, is an unlikely solution even in a
social casework situation, because the participants - child and parent - are far from
voluntary seekers of aid. Finally, we are
asked to surrender hope for existing delinquent parents as beyond salvage, and concentrate on the rehabilitation of their more
impressionable offspring. But there is a
fresh supply of millions of new parents
each year for the more than four million
annual births in the United States. If the
suggested sanction could influence only the
conduct of new parents in relation to their
children, the attempt to assure parental
responsibility by statute would have ample
justification.
B. Control of Obscene and Horror
Materials in Mass Media
One of the most invincible eccentricities
of current American credibility is refusal
to accept that which is not susceptible to
precise mathematical measurement, and
conversely to entertain with enthusiasm
abstract notions carried to the third decimal place, such as baseball batting averages. For centuries in many civilized
countries, obscene publications have been
supposed to have deleterious effect, and
accordingly been subject to the control of
the criminal law. But .principally because
the impact of such materials has not been
classified on rating scales, or in won-lost
columns, their suppression is currently
being considered an unwarranted infringement of liberty of opinion.
There is divergent opinion among laymen as to whether there is significant relationship between exposure to obscene and
horror materials and overt criminal and
delinquent behavior. An overwhelming
majority of police chiefs (82.6 percent)
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recently surveyed in the United States, its
Territories, and Canada, recommended
more consistent enforcement of adequate
statutes in this area to reduce crime and
delinquency amQng young persons. 19 A
number of writers have expressed similar
opinions from time to time on the impact
of such materials; 20 others have questioned
the existence of any considerable connection between criminal behavior and indecent publications. 1 Of course, there is no
scientific demonstration that any young
offender would not have committed a
given crime but for his exposure to certain
horror or obscene materials. Nor is it possible to see how science, with all its
advances, could isolate the impact of such
materials from the myriad stimuli in a
child's world, and measure its effect-with
unerring calibration. Yet the federal gov23
ernment, 22 and all but one of our states,
and many of the civilized nations of the
world 24 have made legislative appraisal of
the social danger inherent in the dissemi19 THE INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 13-14, 66-67.
2

o See ELLIS, THE CRIMINAL 419 (1907); HEALY,
THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT 224, 233 (1915);
SIGHELE,
LITTERATURE
ET CRIMINALITE
222
(1908); Baker, The Press and Crime, 33 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 463 (1943); Preston, Children's Reactions to Movie Horrors and Radio Crime, 19
J. PEDIATRY 147 (1941).
21 See United States v. Roth, 237 F. 2d 796, 821
(2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion), cert. granted,
352 U.S. 964 (1957).

183, 18 U.S.C.A. §1461 (Supp. 1956).

22

69

23

New Mexico, the only American state lacking a

STAT.

general criminal statute on obscenity, authorizes
its municipalities to prohibit dissemination of such
materials.
24 E.g., Argentina,

Belgium, England,

France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, and Russia.
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nation of deleterious prints. In balancing
the constitutional interest in freedom of
expression against the evil sought to be
suppressed by such statutes, some weight
must be given to this contemporary crosssection and authoritative opinion of mankind, to say nothing of two centuries of
experience in the enforcement of such
prohibitions in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Curiously enough, constitutional obstacles to the enforcement of statutes
prohibiting dissemination of indecent
materials have been interposed only as recently as 1948, and actually coincide with
the unprecedented rise in the rate of de.linquency from that date. In the preceding
157 years since the adoption of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court of the
United States never interfered on constitutional grounds with federal or state convictions in this area. 25 Then in 1948, a
divided court, after three arguments of the
case, held unconstitutional a statute effective in twenty states that made criminal
dissemination of materials "principally
made up of criminal news, police reports,
or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures,
or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or
crime," so massed as to become vehicles
for inciting, violent and depraved crimes
against the person. The Court made no
reference to any interest served by the
instant publication involved, a pulp magazine devoted to horror stories. The legislation was held invalid on its face, regardless
of its application, on the ground that its
warning was too vague, and this despite a
During that period in only two prosecutions,
both federal, convictions were reversed on nonconstitutional grounds. Swearington v. United
States, 162 U.S. 446 (1896); United States v.
Chase, 135 U.S. 225 (1890).
25

careful and narrowing construction by the
2G
state court.
In 1954, the Supreme Court unanimously held invalid state motion picture
censorship. 27 Forty years earlier the same
Court had held, with equal unanimity,
28
"
that such legislation was constitutional.
Early in 1957, the Court held unconstitu-.
tional a state statute prohibiting dissemination of obscene material, apparently
because it embodied this test of obscenity:
"tending to incite minors to violent or
depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth." A unanimous Court found such
language obnoxious: "Surely, this is to
burn the house to roast the pig."' 29 No
mention was made of the fact that this test
of obscenity was one of the first judicially
formulated,30 had been employed 'in the
courts for more than four score years,
especially in states with considerable litigation involving obscenity, 31 and indeed
had been found unobjectionable by the
Supreme Court itself.3 2 As this is written,
26 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
27 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ.,

346 U.S. 587 (1954).
28 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236
U.S. 230 (1915).
29 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
See also 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 180 (April 1957).

30 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
31 See People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 411 (1884);
People v. Berg, 241 App. Div. 543, 544-45, 272
N.Y. Supp. 586, 587-88 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 269
N.Y. 514, 199 N.E. 513 (1934); People v. Pesky,
230 App. Div. 200, 203-04, 243 N.Y. Supp. 193,
196-98 (1st Dep't), afl'd per curiam, 254 N.Y.
373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930). See also Commonwealth v. Eisenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d
840 (1945); Commonwealth v. Delacy, 271 Mass.
327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930); Commonwealth v.
Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930);
Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 86
N.E. 910 (1909).
32 Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896).
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the Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of the federal obscenity statute, even though that act embodies no
special tests involving the morals
of the
immature.""
The balance between free speech and
the prevention of crime and delinquency
among young persons is a delicate one. It
is simple to arrive at an acceptable arrangement if one interest is carefully considered,
and the other obliviously ignored. Certainly,
liberty of opinion is currently receiving
careful consideration. But what about the
interest in halting the ever increasing rate
of crime and delinquency?
It is commonly supposed that government control of literary output, even in
the name of decency, smacks of book burning and benighted despotism. But history
demonstrates that just the opposite is the
case. Political concern with obscenity is a
relatively recent phenomenon that has
coincided with the rise of limited government, freedom of exlression, and modern
democracy. In Anglo-American history,
government control of obscenity dates
from the eighteenth century. 34 One may
search in vain among the ashes of books
burned in ancient despotisms to find a
single instance of censorship invoked in
the name of decency and morality. The
Chinese burned books many centuries
before Christ; but they did so for the-same
reasons that Western broadcasts are
jammed today behind the Iron Curtain. 5-i
33 United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 964 (1957).
34 Rex v. Curl, 2 Str. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B.
1727).
35 See GOODRICH, THE LITERARY INQUISITION OF
CHIEN-LUNG (American Council of Learned Societies, Studies in Chinese and Related Civilizations Pub. No. 1, 1935); Ku Chich Kang, A Study
of Literary Persecution During the Ming, 3 HARV.

J.
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254, 257, 305 (1938).
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The same was the case of suppression of
writings under the most absolutist regimes
in ancient Greece30 and Rome.3 7 One critic
of control of obscenity concedes that, "A
successful absolutism in the very nature of
things is not concerned with the sex
censorship." 38
To those who insist that the law should
keep its hands off all questions of decency
and leave them to the judgment of the
readers and playgoers themselves, an
ardent advocate of freedom answers:
Most of us agree that the law must draw
some line between decency and indecency,
a line between permitted art and art that can
be punished or suppressed ....

They [legis-

lators] and the great majority of their constituents will continue to insist for a long
time to come that there must be some limit
on the literary discussion of the relation between the sexes, and that when this limit is
passed the police or other government
offi39
cials must take vigorous measures.
C. Moral and Religious Training
in Schools
Chaplains in 230 "training schools"
throughout the United States report that
90 percent of the Catholic youth within
these walls have had no instruction in parochial schools. 40 A decade ago, 1,160 men
at Dannemora reported themselves as
Catholics. Only 59 of these were found to
"I( PUTNAM., AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT TIMES 264 (1894).

37 Cramer, Bookburning and Censorship in Ancient Rome, 6 J. HIST. OF IDEAS

165,

169-70,

186-87, 193, 196 (1945).

38

ERNST, TO THE PURE 147 (1928).
" CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

529-30 (1941).
40 Hogan, The Role of Religion in the Prevenlion of Crime and Delinquency, 1 POLICE 27, 29
(1957).
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have ever attended a parochial school. 4 1
The average eighteen year old inmate of a
reformatory is typically a nominal member
of a church he never attends. Conspicuous
silence in the mass of printed material on
the subject about the role of religion in
prevention of delinquency 4 2 may be in
part attributable to the confusion- of
nominal church membership or Sunday
school attendance of reformatory inmates
with real religion based on systematic
training. The preventive efficacy of religionin delinquency and crime is so obvious
and so important that, like so many other
truisms, it is ignored. "Invariably," says
F.B.I. Director Hoover, "when you analyze
the reasons for such [criminal] actions,
certain facts stand out stark and revealing
- the faith of our fathers, the love of God,
and the observance of His Commandments
have either been thrust aside or they never
existed in the heart of the individual transgressor .... The secular way of thinking
must give way to the spiritual if our Nation
43
is to stand.
A curious contradiction exists in current
church-state relations from the viewpoint
of preventing and reducing crime and delinquency among young persons. On one
hand, no indignant taxpayer can be found
to challenge in court the appropriation of
state funds to a reformative institution conducted under religious auspices, or to
question the paid employment of chaplains
in public institutions of the same kind.
Indeed the New York State Constitution
specifically permits government funds for
correctional and reformatory institutions
41

Ibid.

42 See Coogan, Religion a Preventive of Delinquency, 18 FED. PROB. 29 (1954).
43 The Tablet, May 15, 1954, p. 3.

under private control. 4 4 On the other hand,
use of public monies for schools under
religious control, or for religious instruction
in public schools arouses the familiar cry
in the courts of separation of church and
state. The same State Constitution that
permits monies for private reformative
institutions prohibits funds to schools under
45
religious control.
Government recognition of the reformative power of personalized religion is
dimmed by public repudiation of the preventive power of the same religion made
available with official encouragement under compulsory educational programs.
Why public support of religion as a cure
in training schools, but not as a prophylactic in elementary and high schools? For
reducticn of crime and delinquency among
young persons, the more strategic use of
public funds - and the more economic in
the long run - suggests major investment
in a program designed to prevent the
tragedy before it occurs, such as support
of increased moral and religious instruction in all schools, rather than merely
providing such instruction in training
schools after the event. By the time a
youth reaches the reformatory, he has
usually travelled a long way on the criminal path. The rehabilitation of even a
young offender is many times more difficult
under optimum conditions than the prevention of his criminal career in the first
place.
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States states merely that
"Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion ....
" It makes
44
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See Guilfoyle, Church-State Relations in Welfare,
3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 112 (April 1957).
4 N. Y. CONST. art. XI, §4.
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no reference whatsoever to any "wall of
separation" between church and state. A
decade ago, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that this provision of
the Constitution, as made applicable to
the states by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, did not invalidate
a state statute authorizing transportation
of parochial school pupils. But in dictum,
the majority of the Court observed that
states lacked power to "pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one' religion over another."' 46 In 1952, in
the course of sustaining a program of released time for religious instruction of public school pupils, a majority of the Court
apparently repudiated this earlier view so
far as it denied validity to state laws which
"aid all religions." "We cannot read into
the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of

(1947).
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hostility to religion." '47 In this most recent
pronouncement on the question of churchstate relations, the view prevailed that:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses.
.. When the state encourages religious instruction

....

it follows the best of our

traditions.... But we find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the
48
effective scope of religious influence.
Carried to its logical limits, this view
suggests no federal constitutional barrier
to the extension of existing state-church
cooperation in the correction and reform
of young offenders to a program of prevention of such 'criminal careers by increased religious and moral instruction in
the schools.
47

46 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
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